Many settlement contracts in lawsuits that involve either multiple plaintiffs or multiple defendants include so-called most-favored-nation (MFN) clauses. If a defendant who faces multiple claims, for example, settles with some plaintiffs early and settles with additional plaintiffs later for a greater amount, then the early settlers will receive the more favorable terms as well. This paper presents two frameworks for evaluating the private and social desirability of MFN clauses. First, MFN clauses can mitigate asymmetric-information problems and encourage cases to settle earlier. While avoiding delayed settlement is privately and socially desirable, it is shown that the litigation rate may rise. Second, MFN clauses may be used as a bargaining tool for extracting value from future plaintiffs, leading to breakdowns in future negotiations.
1. Although these contractual provisions are commonly referred to as "MFN clauses," this is misnomer. A name like "most favored plaintiff " or "most favored settler" might be more fitting.
The Settling Defendants agree that if they enter into any future pre-verdict settlement agreement of other litigation brought by a non-federal governmental plaintiff on terms more favorable to such governmental plaintiff than the terms of this Settlement Agreement (after due consideration of relevant differences in population or other appropriate factors), the terms of this Settlement Agreement will be revised so that the State of Florida will obtain treatment at least as relatively favorable. (Florida v. American Tobacco Co., No. 95-1466 AH [Fla. 15th Cir., August 25, 1997 ) 2 The settlements with Texas and Mississippi were similar (Van Voris 1998, p. A6 ). An MFN clause was also used in the 1999 Vitamins class action settlement (Warren & Wilke 1999, p. A3) . Plaintiffs in that case were free to opt out of the class settlement to pursue individual lawsuits, but those who opted out could not receive more money in settlement unless the main class received the more favorable terms also. In the 1979 price-fixing case against producers of broiler chickens, defendants who settled early were assured that if another defendant settled on better terms in the future, then they would receive the better terms as well (In re Chicken Antitrust Litigation, 560 F. Supp. 943 [Ga. 1979] ).
A key feature in each of these examples is that the MFN clause applied to future settlement agreements only and not to future judgments. When the tobacco industry settled with the state of Minnesota in 1998, the previous MFN clauses were triggered, and payments to Florida, Texas, and Mississippi were increased by $1.8 billion, $2.3 billion, and $.6 billion, respectively (Tobacco Industry Litigation Report 1998, p. 6). These additional payments would not have been necessary had the Minnesota case reached a verdict. Since future settlements are "taxed" but future judgments are not, MFN clauses can lead settlement negotiations to break down altogether. In the Vitamins case, some disgruntled class members anticipated this and challenged the MFN clause, arguing that it would deprive them of due process by forcing "them to either remain in the Class or to litigate this case to the end" (In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation, This Document Relates to: All Actions, 1999-2 Trade Cas.
[CCH] 72,726).
jacketed' by the most-favored-nations agreements with certain prior settling defendants, the strong public policies favoring complete settlement . . . are being frustrated" (Chicken, 560 F. Supp. at 947) . On the other hand, champions of MFN clauses argue they are an efficient way of "getting to yes." In the Vitamins case, class counsel claimed that the MFN clause was "essential to the settlement and that without it the parties would not have reached agreement" (In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation, This Document Relates to: All Actions, 1999-2 Trade Cas.
[CCH] 72,726). The Manual for Complex Litigation, a reference manual for judges, gives a balanced view: " [MFN] clauses can provide an incentive for early settlement as well as an obstacle to later settlement (Manual for Complex Litigation 1995, sec. 23.23, p. 182) . 4 The purpose of this paper is to understand why a defendant who faces multiple plaintiffs (or a plaintiff who faces multiple defendants) would adopt an MFN clause and whether this serves the broader public interest. The private motives for MFN clauses in settlement contracts fall into two broad categories: (1) MFN clauses mitigate problems of asymmetric information, and (2) MFN clauses can be used as a tool for extracting value from future plaintiffs. These private motives are not perfectly aligned with the interests of society.
First, I will argue that MFN clauses economize on delay costs when plaintiffs have "private information" about what they are willing to settle for. 5 Plaintiffs who have weak cases will engage in posturing, trying to convince the defendant that they are strong. We will see that MFN clauses lead cases that would have settled on the courthouse steps to settle early instead (Spier 2003) . While early settlement is socially desirable, there can be undesirable side-effects of MFN clauses. In particular, the defendant may choose a more aggressive settlement strategy in which more cases go to trial than before. Furthermore, MFN clauses may distort the defendant's incentives to take precautions to avoid injuries to begin with. Second, I will argue that MFN clauses can be used strategically to extract value from future plaintiffs. In other words, defendants may favor a "Ulysses-tied-to-the-mast arrangement that enables them to con-4. While this most recent edition of the manual gives a balanced view of MFN clauses, earlier editions were far more negative about their use.
5. Two recent surveys of the settlement literature more generally are Daughety (1999) and Hay and Spier (1998) .
Not surprisingly, this value-stealing motive for adopting MFN clauses is not socially desirable. An MFN clause can lead future negotiations to break down, and the resulting costs of litigation and delay are not fully internalized by the parties who drafted the clause to begin with. 7 The previous work on nondiscrimination clauses-including MFN clauses, most-favored-customer clauses, and best-price provisionsconsiders fundamentally different environments. The term "most favored nation" is, of course, borrowed from the international arena. Warren Schwartz and Alan Sykes give a good discussion of the positive and normative implications of these contracts in international trade (Schwartz and Sykes 1998) . In the industrial organization literature, 8 Steven Salop and Thomas Cooper argue that promises to meet-or-beat the competition can be a facilitating practice, serving to soften market rivalry (Salop 1986; Cooper 1986 ; see also the other references in Lyon [1998] ).
9 David Butz has argued that best-price provisions mitigate the time-inconsistency problem that a monopolist faces when selling a durable good. (Butz 1990) . 10 Cooper and Timothy Fries and also William Neilson and Harold Winter argued that best-price provisions in supplier relationships change the future bargaining games and may be used strategically (Cooper and Fries 1991; Neilson and Winter 1994) . None of these papers considers the use of MFN clauses in settlement or anticipates the welfare concerns unique to the litigation environment.
11
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a model of a single defendant who negotiates with a group of plaintiffs in which each plaintiff has private information about his or her willingness to accept. The defendant "ties himself to the mast" in order to get plaintiffs to reveal their information and settle earlier. Section 3 6. These are the words of Judge Williams in his Vitamins opinion. Being "tied to the mast" allowed Odysseus to avoid falling victim to the temptation of the sirens.
7. This kind of effect was also featured in Aghion and Bolton (1987) .
8. For an excellent survey of this literature, see Lyon (1998). 9. There are several reasons why this issue is not as relevant in the litigation context. First, MFN clauses are not drafted to apply to future contracts offered by third parties; they apply to future settlement offers made by the drafter of the original contract. Second, lawsuits often settle for fixed sums of money, and these fixed sums will not typically affect the future play of games. Third, MFN clauses are often used when the players are not in competition with one another (Minnesota and Florida are not competitors).
10. This was originally pointed out in Coase (1972) . See also Png (1991) and DeGraba and Postlewaite (1992) .
11. But see the recent working paper by Daughety and Reinganum (2002). considers in detail how an MFN clause changes the bargaining range with future plaintiffs. By tying himself to the mast, the defendant gets future plaintiffs to settle for less. Section 4 discusses the practical difficulties encountered in drafting and enforcing these MFN clauses. Section 5 offers concluding thoughts and directions for future research.
PRIVATE INFORMATION
Settlement negotiations can fail when the two sides have different beliefs about what will happen at trial. The earliest academic work on settlement took parties' beliefs as exogenous-they simply "agreed to disagree" (see Landes 1971; Posner 1973; Gould 1973) . A troubling feature of these early models was that the litigants did not behave strategically or update their beliefs before trial. A rational economic actor would revise downward his optimistic assessment of his own chances once it becomes clear-during the course of bargaining perhaps-how optimistic his informed opponent is. Later, researchers explicitly modeled the litigants' beliefs and settlement strategies using noncooperative game theory and information economics.
12
"Private information" in litigation environments can have a variety of origins. Plaintiffs will initially know more about the extent of their actual damages, for example, while defendants may have better knowledge of the extent of liability or degree of negligence. While some of this information will come out over the course of discovery, not all of it will. Furthermore, each side often has private information about its own skills and efforts (past, present, and future) that will come into play in the courtroom and in the quality and credibility of their witnesses.
13
Private information often leads to inefficiencies in the settlement process; many cases settle on the courthouse steps, and some fail to settle altogether. 14 This section shows that most-favored-nation clauses play an important role in settlements that involve multiple plaintiffs with private information. The MFN clause commits the defendant not to raise his offers in the future, and, as a consequence, plaintiffs who would have behaved 12. Early papers on settlement under these circumstances include Bebchuk (1984) and Reinganum and Wilde (1986) . See also the surveys of Daughety (1999) and Hay and Spier (1998) .
13. For a simple model of endogenous asymmetric information, see Hay (1995). 14. The deadline effect in settlement is modeled in Spier (1992). strategically and settled on the courthouse steps are induced to settle early instead. This effect-early instead of late settlement-is good from a public policy perspective. The commitment power afforded by MFN clauses can have a darker side, though. The defendant can take advantage of the lower delay costs and choose a more aggressive settlement strategy, increasing the litigation rate. Therefore, the overall effect of MFN clauses on social welfare is ambiguous.
The Two-Type Model
Suppose a large group of risk-neutral plaintiffs has been injured by a single defendant. 15 that these costs are independent of how many cases ultimately go to trial-there are no scale economies, so to speak. We also assume that , so even the weak plaintiffs have a credible threat to
litigate. Finally, we assume that costs of the litigation and delay are strictly positive and let and .
Each plaintiff has essentially three choices in this game: to accept right away, to wait and settle in round 2 for an expected payoff of S 1 , or to reject both offers and go to trial for a payoff of ,
where . Although the model assumes no discounting for simplicity, i p L, H including a common discount rate would not change the results because all of the values may be interpreted in present-discounted-value terms.
Commitment Power and Most-Favored-Nation Clauses
It is not hard to see that the defendant would like to precommit not to settle in round 2. To see why, suppose instead that the defendant commits to a sequence of offers in which some plaintiffs settle in each round. If this were true, it would have to be the case that . The plain-
tiffs who settle out of court are in fact indifferent between the two settlement offers. 19 The defendant, on the other hand, is certainly not indifferent between the two settlement offers. It costs to settle with S 1 plaintiffs in round 1 and costs to settle with the S ϩ c p S ϩ c ϩ c
plaintiffs in round 2. By committing not to settle in round 2, the defendant gets plaintiffs who would have settled on the courthouse steps to settle early instead, saving himself .
The defendant's best settlement offer in round 1 will be either a low offer, , or a high offer, . 20 The low offer 20. The underlying assumption here is that a plaintiff will accept an offer when indifferent between accepting and going to trial. Alternatively, one could add a penny to each of these offers to make the plaintiff strictly prefer acceptance. This would complicate the expressions, however, without changing the results. tiffs surely reject this offer, so the defendant's total payments from the low-offer strategy are
This strategy lets the defendant fine-tune his payments to the two types: he pays less to the weak plaintiffs in settlement and pays more to the strong plaintiffs at trial. The high-offer strategy gives the strong plaintiffs what they would get if they went to trial, . Since the
weak plaintiffs would be delighted to accept the high offer, too, the defendant's total payments from the high-offer strategy are
Although the defendant avoids all costs of litigation and delay here, he is "overpaying" the weak plaintiffs. The defendant is indifferent between the low-offer strategy and the high-offer strategy when the volume of low types, , is exactly
Using this cutoff, , we can easily characterize the defendant's best v* settlement strategy. Proposition 1. If the defendant can commit to a settlement strategy at the beginning of the game, he will refuse to settle in round 2. i) If , the defendant makes a low settlement offer in round 1,
Weak plaintiffs accept the early offer, and strong plain-
tiffs reject it and go to trial. ii) If , the defendant makes a high settlement offer in round
. All plaintiffs accept the early offer.
It is important to note that commitment is critical here. When there are sufficiently many weak types in the plaintiff population, , the v 1 v* L defendant will make a low offer that the strong plaintiffs reject. The defendant's refusal to settle in round 2 is not sequentially rational. Indeed, once round 2 is reached, the defendant would like to raise his offer and settle with the strong plaintiffs too. The MFN clause is an effective commitment mechanism. If the defendant subsequently settles with the strong plaintiffs in round 2, the MFN provision obligates the defendant to pay the higher amount to the weak plaintiffs who settled earlier. The MFN clause makes raising the offer to settle with the strong plaintiffs prohibitively expensive.
Proposition 2. The defendant can achieve the commitment outcome (proposition 1) with an MFN clause.
Proof.
See the Appendix.
Most-favored-nation clauses destroy settlement opportunities ex post; the defendant is "tied to the mast" and cannot settle with the strong plaintiffs in round 2. Although commitment certainly benefits the defendant, it is not clear that MFN clauses are in the interest of society more broadly. To assess the social desirability of MFN clauses, we need to understand what would happen in this game if MFN clauses were not feasible and commitment was otherwise impossible.
Settlement without Most-Favored-Nation Clauses
If commitment is impossible, the defendant will certainly succumb to temptation in round 2 and make an offer that at least some of the remaining plaintiffs will accept. The defendant will make either a low offer or a high offer. If he offers (the low offer), then the
weak plaintiffs will accept and the strong plaintiffs will reject and go to trial. If the defendant offers (the high offer), then all of
the remaining plaintiffs, strong and weak, will accept . By analogy to S 2 the earlier analysis, the defendant will make the low offer when the remaining volume of weak plaintiffs is above a threshold
Note that . Intuitively, the low settlement offer becomes relativelŷ v ! v* more attractive in round 2 than in round 1 since the delay costs, and c p , are sunk. c d
What will happen in round 1? If the defendant makes a high settlement offer, , then every plaintiff will accept immedi-
ately. Being rational and forward-looking, they realize that the deal simply cannot get any better. Suppose instead that the defendant makes a low settlement offer, . Would any plaintiff be willing to
accept this offer? It turns out that this is a tricky question with a subtle answer.
It cannot be the case that all of the weak plaintiffs will accept a low offer in round 1. If they did, then only the strong plaintiffs would remain in round 2, and the defendant would surely make a high offer in round 2. All of the weak plaintiffs who accepted in round 1 would have been better off waiting for the high offer, too. It may be the case, however, that some weak plaintiffs accept the low offer in round 1. Formally, the volume of weak plaintiffs who reject must be at least . If enougĥ S v 1 weak plaintiffs remain in round 2, then the defendant's best offer in round 2 is . It is proved in the Appendix that exactly weak
plaintiffs will reject the defendant's first offer to settle. Notice that , so the weak plaintiffs are in fact indifferent between the S p S Ϫ c 1 2 p two settlement offers and are happy to settle in either round.
Proposition 3.
Suppose that MFN clauses are not feasible, so the defendant cannot commit to a settlement strategy at the beginning of the game. There exists a cutoff, , with .
, the defendant makes a low offer in round 1,
. Some weak plaintiffs accept this offer (volume ). Thê
defendant subsequently makes a low offer in round 2, , and
all remaining weak plaintiffs accept (volume ). The strong plaintiffŝ v reject both offers and go to trial.
ii) If , the defendant makes a high offer in round 1,
, and all plaintiffs, weak and strong, accept.
Proof.
As in proposition 2, the defendant's best settlement strategy hinges on the volume of weak plaintiffs in the population, . The cutoff when v L MFN clauses are not feasible, , is higher than the cutoff when MFN v** clauses are used, . This means that the defendant is less likely to choose v* a low-offer strategy when MFN clauses are prohibited. Intuitively, there are additional costs of pursuing the low-offer strategy in this world without commitment, namely, the delay costs associated with weak plaintiffs who settle on the courthouse steps.
The Social Desirability of Most-Favored-Nation Clauses
We have seen that MFN clauses credibly commit the defendant not to raise his settlement offer, and so plaintiffs will settle early rather than wait to settle on the courthouse steps. This is unambiguously good for the defendant. Holding the terms of settlement fixed, MFN clauses reduce the defendant's cost of delay. This section asks whether MFN clauses are in the interest of the plaintiffs and of society more broadly. Suppose that without MFN clauses, the defendant pursues the low-offer strategy. If MFN clauses are feasible, the defendant will still pursue the low-offer strategy, but (1) there will be less delay, (2) the litigation rate will be the same, and (3) the plaintiffs will be no worse off.
Without MFN clauses, the defendant pursues a low-offer strategy whenever there are sufficiently many weak plaintiffs in the population, (proposition 3). This strategy is expensive for the defendant v 1 v** L because of (1) the cost of bringing the strong plaintiffs all the way to trial and (2) the additional costs of delay associated with weak plaintiffs who settle on the courthouse steps. When MFN clauses are permitted, the low-offer strategy becomes relatively more attractive because these latter delay costs are avoided. Through the MFN clause, the defendant credibly commits not to settle on the courthouse steps. When MFN clauses are feasible, the terms of settlement do not change; the defendant still chooses the low offer, and so the plaintiffs are no worse off. The main effect of MFN clauses in this case is to reduce the cost of delay (a benefit that is enjoyed by the defendant alone).
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Although MFN clauses are effective in reducing delay costs and do not harm the plaintiffs in this case, we do have to be concerned about the defendant's incentives to take precautions at an ex ante stage. By eliminating the costs of delay, the defendant is "getting off easier." In products liability, for example, we need to provide manufacturers with the right incentives to design their products safely and to disclose relevant risks to the public. If the defendant has the appropriate incentives when MFN clauses are not used, then he will certainly take too few precautions if he anticipates that he will settle with MFN clauses in the future. 22 It is important to recognize, however, that imposing delay costs on defendants is a less-than-ideal way to create appropriate incentives for care. Ceteris paribus, it is better to create incentives using nondistortionary sanctions instead of distortionary ones. The interests of society could be better served by allowing MFN clauses and, at the same time, increasing the monetary penalties on defendants. This may be accomplished in different ways such as damage multipliers 23 or forcing the defendant to bear the plaintiffs costs of litigation (the English rule).
21. Spier (2003) also shows that this stark result is obtained in an example in which the distribution of plaintiffs in the population is uniform (it is not true more generally, however). There, as here, the defendant chooses the very same settlement offers with and without MFN clauses. In equilibrium, each plaintiff receives exactly the same amount with and without an MFN clause.
22. If, on the other hand, the defendant was taking too many precautions to begin with, then MFN clauses could bring the outcome closer to the social optimum.
23. More generally, one would have to be careful when imposing damage multipliers. Damage multipliers tend to exacerbate the asymmetric information and would lead to more litigation than otherwise. This would not happen in the cases described in observation 1, Observation 2. Suppose that, without MFN clauses, the defendant pursues a high-offer strategy. When MFN clauses are feasible, the defendant may choose a low-offer strategy instead. If so, (1) there will be more delay, (2) the litigation rate will rise, and (3) the plaintiffs will be worse off with MFN clauses.
Without MFN clauses, the defendant will pursue a high-offer strategy whenever the volume of weak plaintiffs is below a threshold, (v ≤ v** L in proposition 3). When there are relatively few weak plaintiffs in the population, the low-offer strategy is too expensive: it involves the costs of settling on the courthouse steps with the low types in addition to the costs of bringing the high types to trial. When MFN clauses are permitted, the low-offer strategy becomes relatively more attractive because the delay costs associated with the weak plaintiffs is avoided. It follows that there is an intermediate range of parameter values, ,
where the defendant chooses the low-offer strategy with MFN clauses but the high-offer strategy without MFN clauses.
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In this intermediate range, the MFN clause transforms the defendant from a "softie," settling all cases for a high amount, into a "toughie," making low-ball offers that only the weak plaintiffs accept and taking the rest to trial. This hard-line approach prompted by the MFN clause harms social welfare for two reasons. First, strong plaintiffs go to trial with total delay and litigation costs . Second, the defendant's inc ϩ k centives to take care at an ex ante stage are diluted (assuming that the defendant was not overinvesting in precautions to begin with). It appears that policy makers would be well advised to prohibit MFN clauses in these circumstances. On the other hand, identifying these particular circumstances may be difficult, and we know from observation 1 that there is reason for encouraging the private use of MFN clauses.
Comparison with the Durable-Goods Monopoly
The results in this section may be puzzling to readers who are familiar with the time-inconsistency problem faced by the durable-goods monopolist. There, MFN clauses are unambiguously bad for public policy.
where the strong plaintiffs go to trial anyway. See Spier (2003) for more discussion and a formal analysis of damage multipliers with a continuous distribution of plaintiff types.
24. Note that the plaintiffs are collectively worse off with MFN clauses in observation 2. They would be well advised to cooperate with one another and collectively refuse to enter into MFN clauses. In particular, the strong plaintiffs could bribe the weak ones to refuse to accept MFN clauses.
Here, they can be good. This subsection presents a brief overview of the durable-goods framework and highlights the salient differences.
In 1972, Ronald Coase made striking conjecture: a monopolist who sells a durable good to long-lived consumers would not be able to sustain monopoly prices over time (Coase 1972) . Suppose he charged the monopoly price, and consumers who valued the product above this price bought the product immediately. Knowing that the empty-handed consumers value the product less than those who purchased early, the monopolist would subsequently lower the price to sell to the low-valuation consumers, too. At first glance, this might appear to be a profitable strategy for the monopolist. But it poses a problem when consumers are far-sighted: high-valuation consumers will anticipate the falling prices and postpone their purchases. Coase conjectured that the monopolist's prices would fall to marginal cost "in the twinkling of an eye" (Coase 1972, p. 143) . 25 Coase pointed out that one way the durable-goods monopolist can avoid falling prey to his own future greed is through most-favoredcustomer clauses (MFC clauses, also called best-price provisions or money-back guarantees). 26 With an MFC clause, any discount given in the future would require a rebate to all of the consumers who purchased earlier at higher prices. This makes it prohibitively expensive for the monopolist to subsequently lower his price and allows the durable-goods monopolist to commit to the monopoly price. It follows that MFC clauses are necessarily bad from a public policy perspective because monopoly pricing imposes a deadweight loss on society.
Pretrial bargaining differs from Coase's durable-goods monopoly in several fundamental ways.
27 First, the pretrial bargaining game has common values; a plaintiff's private information about what will happen at trial directly affects the payoffs of both the plaintiff and the defendant. Second, since the plaintiff's private information is relevant only at trial, the passage of time before trial does not serve a screening function. Finally, the pretrial bargaining model has a natural deadline imposed by a trial date. In the absence of MFN clauses, the defendant does not fall into the Coasean trap and raise his settlement offer "in the twinkling of an eye." Instead, the defendant bides his time and then settles with many of the plaintiffs on the courthouse steps. Most-favored-nation 25. This conjecture is formally proved by Bulow (1982) and Stokey (1981) .
26. This idea was formalized in by Butz (1990) . See also Tirole (1988, p. 85) .
27. For more discussion of this comparison, see Spier (1992) .
clauses can create social value here by reducing delay. In the durablegoods monopoly framework, the market cleared "in the twinkling of an eye," and so there was no delay to begin with.
VALUE EXTRACTION
The previous sections argued that MFN clauses are valuable to the defendant (in cases with multiple plaintiffs)-and sometimes to society as a whole-because they mitigate the problem of asymmetric information and lead to earlier settlement. For tractability, this point was illustrated in a model in which the defendant had the power to make take-it-orleave-it offers to the plaintiffs. When this assumption is relaxed, so that the plaintiffs have some bargaining power as well, then MFN clauses may be adopted for a second reason. Simply put, MFN clauses limit the surplus that future plaintiffs can capture in settlement negotiations, surplus that may be shared among the defendant and the early-settling plaintiffs. 28 Here, MFN clauses are socially undesirable because they can lead future settlement negotiations to fail.
The Effect of a Preexisting Most-Favored-Nation Clause on Settlement Negotiations
Suppose that the defendant has settled an earlier case for with an S 1 MFN clause. How will the MFN clause affect the bargaining game with a new plaintiff? The answer hinges on the magnitude of the stakes of the second case relative to . When the second case has a much larger S 1 expected judgment than the first, the MFN clause will lead negotiations to break down altogether. When the second case has a much smaller expected judgment than the first, the MFN clause is toothless and will have no effect on the bargaining game with the second plaintiff. When the stakes of the second case are in an intermediate range, however, the preexisting MFN clause will serve to extract value from the second plaintiff.
Formally, suppose the defendant faces a second plaintiff with expected damage award . If the case goes to trial, the plaintiff and . The most that the defendant is willing to pay the second max {S Ϫ S , 0} 2 1 plaintiff, , makes the defendant indifferent between accepting the offer S 2 and going to trial, , or
Suppose that the defendant has settled an earlier case for with an MFN clause and is currently facing a new plaintiff S 1 with expected damages .
x 2 i) If , then , and the second case
, and the second case settles.
iii) If , then , and the second case goes to trial.
Proposition 4 suggests an important trade-off. A private benefit accrues in the intermediate range, where the MFN clause tends to reduce the surplus captured by the second plaintiff. A private cost is borne in the high range, since negotiations break down and cases proceed to costly litigation. Intuitively, the defendant and the first plaintiff may adopt the MFN clause when the private benefits of including the clause exceed the private costs. But there are social costs that are not internalized by the defendant and the first plaintiff. In particular, they do not consider the litigation costs of the second plaintiff should future negotiations fail.
The Private Desirability of Most-Favored-Nation Clauses
Would the defendant and the first plaintiff choose to settle their case for with an MFN clause to begin with? The private decision to include S 1 an MFN clause hinges on several important factors. I will argue that MFN clauses will not be used (1) when the second plaintiff is very weak bargainer or (2) when the second plaintiff's case is very different in magnitude from the first case. Most-favored-nation clauses will be useful, however, when the second plaintiff has some bargaining power and the second case has a similar expected judgment at trial.
Suppose that the defendant expects to have all of the bargaining power when negotiating with the second plaintiff or, equivalently, the ability to make a take-or-or-leave-it offer. Without an MFN clause, the defendant would offer to settle with the second plaintiff for S p 2 and would capture all of the bargaining surplus, .
Since the defendant gets the entire bargaining surplus anyway, there is no additional private benefit of including the MFN clause here. There may be a private cost, however. When is in the high range, the second x 2 case may go to trial, and the defendant would be forced to pay x ϩ 2 in total. He would be better off without an MFN clause because he k d could settle the second case for . Most-favored-nation clauses will
certainly not be adopted when the defendant and the first plaintiff anticipate that the second plaintiff will have no bargaining clout. Most-favored-nation clauses will also not be adopted if the second case is expected to be much smaller or much larger than the first. When the second case is relatively weak, so that , then there is no
advantage from including an MFN clause in the first contract. The bargaining range with the second plaintiff is unaffected by the preexisting MFN clause, and neither the defendant nor the first plaintiff benefits from the inclusion of an MFN clause. There is no private benefit of including the MFN clause here. If the second case is relatively strong, so that , then including the MFN clause is worse than
ineffective-it is destructive. The bargaining range with the second plaintiff disappears, forcing the second case into trial, where litigation costs are borne. In this case, the defendant and the first plaintiff would be better off settling for without an MFN clause. S 1 There is an opportunity for the defendant and the first plaintiff to jointly benefit from an MFN clause when .
In this range, the preexisting MFN clause makes the defendant "tough," lowering the most that he is willing to pay to settle the second case. Any value extracted from the second plaintiff may be shared by the defendant and the first plaintiff through their settlement agreement. Compared with their payoffs without MFN clauses, the first plaintiff is getting $2 million more and the defendant is paying $1 million less. The joint gain of the defendant and the first plaintiff-an additional $3 million-is coming out of the second plaintiff's pocket. Intuitively, the second plaintiff is being "squeezed" in settlement negotiations-he cannot get a penny more than what he would get if the case went to trial. The MFN clause has succeeded in extracting all of the bargaining surplus.
The Divergence of the Private and Social Desirability of Most-Favored-Nation Clauses
The simple example in the previous section showed that both the defendant and the first plaintiff can privately gain by including an MFN efficiency would be restored. The plaintiff would concede on the claim, and each player could capture some of the bargaining surplus. While negotiations would be efficient in this case, MFN clauses may still be used. In renegotiation, the MFN clause brings three parties to the bargaining table instead of two, probably reducing the value captured by the second plaintiff. See the related issue in Perotti and Spier (1993) and Spier and Sykes (1998) .
31. In round , the most the defendant is willing to pay is , while the least
the plaintiff is willing to accept is . So with equal bargaining power, the case
clause in their settlement contract. The MFN clause is used strategically by the defendant and the first plaintiff to extract value from the second plaintiff. This involves a pure transfer. There was no direct social waste in this example: both cases settled, and no litigation costs are actually borne. 32 But what if the defendant and the first plaintiff negotiated their settlement contract before they knew the precise value of the second case? When contracting with uncertainty about the future, the private and social incentives to include MFN clauses will typically diverge.
For a stark demonstration of this simple point, suppose that the defendant expects to have no bargaining power in round 2. In this special case, the inclusion of an MFN clause has no effect on the defendant's payoff in round 2 but will make the first plaintiff better off and therefore will be included. To see why, notice that if negotiations break down in round 2-which they might-the defendant will pay at trial. If
negotiations succeed, then he will pay either in settle-
ment to the second plaintiff or a total of to both
plaintiffs together. In other words, once round 2 is reached, the defendant neither gains nor loses from having an MFN clause. 33 The first plaintiff, on the other hand, receives an additional payment of
when is in the intermediate range, surplus that would
otherwise have gone into the second plaintiff's pocket. 34 To summarize, when the second plaintiff has all of the bargaining power, the defendant and the first plaintiff jointly gain from including an MFN clause in their settlement contract. Although the MFN clause is in the mutual interest of the first plaintiff and the defendant in this example, the clause is clearly socially wasteful. The defendant and the first plaintiff adopted the MFN clause for purely 32. It is important to recognize, however, that there may be indirect social costs. Since the defendant uses MFN clauses to evade liability, he may not take as much care in his primary activities as he would if MFN clauses were banned.
33. The defendant does not lose anything when negotiations break down. The losses are borne by the second plaintiff, who can no longer extract the bargaining surplus.
34. The magnitude of round 1 offer will be determined by negotiations. The defendant would like to be as small as possible (he pays to the first plaintiff and is driven down S S 1 1 to his outside option in round 2), while the first plaintiff would like to be as large as S 1 possible. To see why this latter statement is true, write the first plaintiff's continuation payoff as
Differentiation shows that this is everywhere increasing in . S 1 rent-seeking reasons: to extract surplus from the second plaintiff in the intermediate range. When the second plaintiff has a very valuable case, however, the case goes to trial and the litigation costs, , are
wasted.
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Most-favored-nation clauses are adopted in this example because the two plaintiffs are not coordinating or contracting with each other, an assumption that may be reasonable if the two cases are separated in time. But if he is present and aware of the first case, the second plaintiff may try to bribe the first not to agree to an MFN provision. More generally, the ability of the defendant to take advantage of plaintiffs through MFN clauses may give the plaintiffs the incentive to coordinate their lawsuits and/or hire a common lawyer to represent them. In the Vitamins case, for example, the plaintiffs were (at first) jointly represented by class attorneys. If the incentives of those attorneys were truly aligned with the entire class, one would not expect to see MFN clauses used for value extraction purposes. In such cases, however, it may make sense to adopt MFN clauses to mitigate the asymmetric-information problems discussed earlier.
DIFFICULTIES DRAFTING AND ENFORCING MOST-FAVORED-NATION CLAUSES
The private-information and value extraction frameworks of the previous sections raise several important issues. First, in both frameworks, the MFN clauses applied to preverdict settlements only and not to judgments at trial. As a practical matter, the formal distinction between an out-of-court settlement and judgment is not always clear-cut. Second, MFN clauses are not valuable when the cases are very different from one another. It is often difficult to precisely specify the scope of the MFN clause in the original settlement contract. Third, the stories relied on the clauses not being renegotiated after the fact. What is to prevent renegotiation? We will discuss each of these issues in turn.
A few years ago, MP3.com was sued by the five big record labels for copyright infringement. MP3.com settled with four of the record com-35. If is drawn from a cumulative distribution function , then the expected
social cost is , the litigation costs multiplied by the probability
that negotiations ultimately break down. The idea that MFN clauses can be used strategically to extract value from disorganized plaintiffs is related to Aghion and Bolton (1987) . There, damages for breach of contract extract value from a future trading partner. Here, the MFN clause extracts value from future litigants.
panies in 2000 for a reported $20 million with an MFN clause, but Universal Records held out and refused to settle on these terms. 36 Later that year, a U.S. district court judge found that MP3.com had deliberately infringed copyrights and would therefore be liable for Universal's damages. On the eve of a second trial to determine these damages, Universal and MP3.com met in the judge's chambers and agreed to settle for $53 million (Mathews and DeBaise 2000, p. A3) . 37 The $53 million was entered as a "judgment" instead of a "settlement," so the MFN clause was not triggered. Not surprisingly, the four record companies who had settled earlier objected to this classification: "It doesn't matter what you call it. This is a settlement. . . . If it walks like a duck, talks like a duck, smells like a duck, it's a duck" (Caney 2000) .
When an MFN clause is in place, the defendant and the future plaintiffs have a clear incentive to disguise their settlements as judgments to avoid payments to the early settlers. This will, of course, backfire on the original intent of clause, be it to mitigate problems of asymmetric information or to extract value from the second plaintiff. The defendant would be made worse off ex ante if all plaintiffs realize that MFN clauses can be manipulated in this way. If MFN clauses are socially desirable (after all, they reduced delay in the private-information framework), then judges should be advised not to cooperate with these shenanigans. If, on the other hand, MFN clauses are not in society's interest (as in the value extraction story), then reclassifying a settlement as a judgment would be a social welfare improvement.
The theories presented here suggest that MFN clauses should be written to apply only to sufficiently similar cases. In practice, many settlement contracts with MFN clauses have tried to limit the scope of their future application.
38 Sometimes the language used in the contracts is quite specific. The recent Vitamins antitrust settlement agreement, for example, explicitly excluded vitamin B9 (folic acid) from the agreement, allowing the defendant to settle in the future on better terms on these 36. The settlement also included a licensing provision that would allow MP3.com to continue providing the service. See Newsweek (2000) . 37. After liability was determined, Judge Rakoff ruled that the damages would be $25,000 for each Universal compact disc that was digitally copied by MP3.com. A second trial was scheduled to determine was how many of Universal's discs were involved.
38. The desire to distinguish between groups appears in many other contexts as well. In natural gas markets, for example, MFN clauses typically apply within the boundaries of each field and not across fields. See Butz (1990). issues. 39 In the tobacco case, Florida's MFN clause applied to "litigation brought by a non-federal governmental plaintiff . . . after due consideration of relevant differences in population" (American Tobacco Co., No. 95-1466 AH) . More often, however, MFN clauses are written to exempt future litigants who are not "similarly situated" with the early settlers. In Corrugated Container, a price-fixing case that involved many defendants, an MFN clause that used the "similarly situated" language was interpreted not to apply to defendants who received better terms later because of their inability to pay ("hardship settlements") and was held not to apply to defendants who were not indicted in related criminal cases (In re Corrugated Container Litigation, 1983-1 Trade Cas. [CCH] 65,451). Presumably defendants who were not the targets of criminal investigations were less culpable than their indicted counterparts. The difficulties encountered when interpreting the broad language of these contracts make MFN clauses ripe for ex post opportunism.
Plaintiffs sometimes argue that they are not "similarly situated" to the others and should therefore be exempt from the MFN clause. In the Vitamins case, for example, plaintiff Nutra-Blend argued that it was in a unique position as a blender and suffered greater damages than the other class members and should therefore be permitted to receive more in settlement (Vitamins, 215 F.3d at 30). In the Corrugated Container case, the defendants who settled early argued that the lesser payments made later by insolvent defendants (the "hardship settlements" mentioned earlier) should trigger the MFN provision and entitle them to a refund. The court disagreed.
Some settlement agreements with MFN clauses, including the Corrugated Container case, stipulate that the MFN clause is voided if "present circumstances" change. The chairman of the plaintiff's steering committee in the Corrugated Container case writes to defendant's counsel, "You, however, fully understand that we must retain the freedom to enter into settlement agreements on non-comparable terms with defendants under different circumstances presented as the events of this litigation unfold. For example, as the Court issues rulings in this case and the criminal case, as evidence unfolds in either case, or as the law governing liability or class action changes, it might become obvious that we have a weaker or stronger case than we now think" (Corrugated Container, 1983-1 Trade Cas., p. 70,581) .
In the private-information story, one could think about information coming to light over time. Round 2 of settlement offers could take place after discovery or after the first stage of a bifurcated trial, for example. If it is determined at this point that the defendant is not liable, then the plaintiffs' cases could be dismissed or dropped. If liability is established, on the other hand, then the plaintiffs' cases are even more valuable than before. Either way, "present circumstances have changed." Would the defendant still want to include an MFN clause under these circumstances? Perhaps surprisingly, the answer is often "yes." In particular, the defendant would like to commit not to deal with plaintiffs who delay settlement, even though damning information about liability may come to light in the future.
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In the value extraction story, it would make sense for the defendant to want to exclude cases from the MFN clause if the present circumstances were to change. There, the point of the MFN clause was to extract value from a future case that was not too different. If the present circumstances changed so the future case became for more valuable, then the original purpose of the MFN clause would be frustrated, and the case would go to trial. Contracts that specify that the MFN clause should not apply when "present circumstances change" may rightfully raise a red flag and be viewed with suspicion.
Finally, both frameworks assumed that MFN clauses were a binding obligation to the early settlers. But are these contracts really written in stone? In the private-information story, the defendant knows that only the high types of plaintiffs remain on the courthouse steps. At that point, everyone could be made better off if the MFN clause were renegotiated. If the early settlers agreed to tear up the original contract, then all litigants could share in the surplus of keeping the high types out of court. 41 This may not be much of a problem in practice, however. First, 40. These issues are explored formally in an earlier version of this paper dated October 5, 2001, and available on the Social Science Research Network. It is important to note, however, that MFN clauses may also have a downside when information is arriving over time. Better information allows the defendant to better tailor his settlement offer to the situation at hand. The arrival of new information may create option value for the defendant, and therefore he may not want to settle in round 1 only.
41. Of course, if renegotiation were anticipated, then some of the weak plaintiffs would "pretend" to be strong and would reject the first offer to settle. There would be asymmetric information in settlement as well.
there will be a holdout problem among the weak plaintiffs. Each plaintiff wants the others to concede but would prefer to get the full MFN payout themselves. Second, in some cases (such as the Vitamins settlement), renegotiation would require the approval of a judge. In the value extraction story, renegotiation would simply introduce a third party at the bargaining table: the first plaintiff. With three players instead of two at the bargaining table, the second plaintiff's surplus would be reduced relative to no MFN clause at all. Therefore, the results presented earlier would be obtained, although in modified form. 
CONCLUSION
In the two models presented earlier, MFN clauses "tied the defendant to the mast." The defendant benefited from this in two ways. First, by creating obstacle to future settlement, the defendant could get plaintiffs who would have delayed acceptance of a settlement offer to accept early instead. Second, the defendant could use the MFN clause as a bargaining tool to extract value from future plaintiffs-he could "stiff" them. We also saw that the private incentives to include MFN clauses in settlement contracts do not necessarily coincide with the best interests of society. There are many other issues that were not addressed, issues that remain fruitful for research.
Most-Favored-Nation Clauses as Applied to Judgments at Trial
What would happen in our two frameworks if the MFN clause were modified to apply to judgments as well as settlements? From the defendant's perspective, this modification would be either ineffective (at best) or disastrous (at worst) since every plaintiff-even the very weakest-would be elevated to the level of the very strongest plaintiff. Note that the defendant could achieve the very same outcome without an MFN clause by simply offering to settle all cases, weak and strong, for the strongest plaintiff's value. In the private-information framework, the defendant benefited from sorting the plaintiffs into two groups: the weak plaintiffs settled for less, and the strong plaintiffs went to trial and received more. In the value extraction framework, the MFN clause made the defendant tougher in future negotiations because settlement became more expensive relative to 42. These issues are similar to those in Perotti and Spier (1993) and Spier and Sykes (1998). going to trial. A modified MFN clause that applies to judgments as well as settlements would not change the defendant's relative preferences and therefore would not be an effective bargaining tool.
There is an interesting recent exception to the rule, however. In 2001, Microsoft settled antitrust charges with the state of New Mexico. In their settlement contract, New Mexico will receive the judgment or settlement received by the other states. One commentator referred to this MFN clause as a "free-rider" clause, saying that New Mexico will "reap any benefits from a battle that others will continue to fight" (Dudley and Hendren 2001, p. A1) . Although New Mexico will surely benefit from the efforts of the other states, free riding by itself does not explain the use of the MFN clause. Why not settle for a fixed amount that reflects the anticipated efforts of the other states? A noncontingent settlement contract would have the benefit of avoiding future risk.
One answer may be that officials in New Mexico are concerned about "looking bad" in the event that the other states receive more. Another answer may be that an MFN clause that applies to judgments as well as settlements commits the defendant (Microsoft, in this case) to fight harder in the future, a commitment that has good strategic effects and may, in the long run, reduce the defendant's overall liability. 43 This type of MFN clause creates asymmetric stakes: since every dollar paid to the remaining plaintiffs must be paid to the early settler too, the defendant will fight harder to reduce his liability. In anticipation of the defendant's excessive spending on the case, the plaintiffs may back off and settle their cases for less than before or drop their cases entirely.
Settlement Externalities
All of the previous analysis assumed that the costs of pursuing (or defending) multiple claims were simply the sum of the costs of pursuing (or defending) the claims independently. In other words, the plaintiffs' cases were independent of one another. In reality, there are often economies of scale in litigation. Indeed, plaintiffs often join their claims or form a class action to take advantage of these scale economies. The 43. Another reason why a defendant may want to make the MFN clause apply to judgments at trial is to credibly signal his type to the plaintiffs. The defendant might argue: "I am not liable for your damages, so I will settle with you for a token amount. If it is ever determined that I am lying to you, and I settle with someone else for more, then you will receive the difference." Levy (2002) shows that best-price guarantees can be an effective signal of quality when a monopolist is selling a durable good and that these guarantees may increase social welfare.
to delay making an offer in the hopes of being the last one remaining at the end of the game. Most-favored-nation clauses may be very useful in this settlement game with externalities. They will limit the most that the remaining plaintiff can extract in settlement. With this assurance, the defendant would be more willing to settle early.
Potential Antitrust Concerns
The earlier sections assumed that the plaintiffs had nothing in common (other than the fact that they were suing the same defendant). In many of the relevant cases, however, the plaintiffs are competitors in the same industry. In the MP3.com case, for example, Sony and Universal compete in the record industry. In the Vitamins lawsuit, the plaintiffs included rival food manufacturers. And in the Corrugated Container case, the defendants were rival manufacturers of cardboard. In these cases, the settlement contracts may affect the future market interactions of these rivals more.
The issue of rivalry was explicitly raised in the Chicken Antitrust case. Many of the chicken processors settled with an MFN clause: if the plaintiffs settled with another defendant on more favorable terms in the future, the early settlers would get a rebate. Several financially weaker processors refused to settle at the same terms. 46 The court was particularly concerned that defendants who were not part of the early settlement would be financially ruined by litigation and that defendants who had settled early would come to dominate the broiler chicken market in the future. Indeed, the court struck down the MFN clause in the Chicken case, arguing that the clause had "predatory intent" (Chicken, 560 F. Supp. at 948).
APPENDIX Proof of Proposition 2
First, when , then , and MFN clauses are unnecessary.
All of the plaintiffs will settle early with or without an MFN clause. Suppose that and the defendant offers together with an MFN
46. This rationale raises an important question. If a defendant would be financially ruined by going to trial, why does he not settle on the same terms as the others?
clause. Plaintiffs with strong cases will surely reject this early offer. 47 But it is a weakly dominant strategy for plaintiffs with low damages to accept . If a S 1 second-round settlement offer happens to be lower, , then the plaintiff is S ! S 2 1 strictly better off accepting . If the second-round offer turns out to be (weakly) S 1 higher, , then the plaintiff's payoff from accepting early is S ≥ S S S ϩ (S Ϫ high damages accept , and plaintiffs with low damages get an additional S 2 . The defendant's payments when he offers to settle on these terms are S Ϫ S 2 1
. Since , simple algebra
shows that the defendant will prefer not to settle with the high types.
Proof of Proposition 3
49. The astute reader will wonder why it cannot be an equilibrium for fewer than to accept . The reason is subtle. From the defendant's perspective, the best outcomê v Ϫ v S slightly to induce the mixed-strategy outcome in the proof.
